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WHY DON’T SOME WHITE SUPREMACIST GROUPS
PAY TAXES?
Eric Franklin Amarante *

ABSTRACT
A number of white supremacist groups enjoy tax-exempt status. These hate
groups do not have to pay federal taxes and people who give money to these
groups may take deductions on their personal taxes. This recognition not only
results in potential lost revenue for government programs, but it also serves as
a public subsidy of racist propaganda and operates as the federal
government’s imprimatur of white supremacist activities. This is all due to an
unnecessarily broad definition of “educational” that somehow encompasses
the activities of universities, symphonies, and white supremacists. This Essay
suggests a change in the Treasury Regulations to restrict the definition of
educational organizations to refer only to traditional, degree-granting
institutions, distance-learning organizations, or certain other enumerated
entities. With this change, we would no longer allow white supremacists to call
themselves charities, remove the public subsidy of such reprehensible
organizations, and eliminate the government’s implicit blessing of hate groups.

INTRODUCTION
“ACLU Defends Nazis’ Right To Burn Down ACLU Headquarters.” 1 Like
many jokes, this Onion 2 headline is funny because it is true. At the risk of
ruining a joke by explaining it, Nazi groups often test the limits of free speech
and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has yet to find an example of
speech it did not want to defend. 3 But the ACLU and white supremacist groups
share more than just a zealous belief in the freedom of speech. Just like a

*
Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Community Economic Development Clinic,
University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Wendy Bach, Michael Kagan, Lydia
Nussbaum, Francine Franklin, Arléne Amarante, and Laura Barrera for their helpful comments and
observations.
1
ACLU Defends Nazis’ Right to Burn Down ACLU Headquarters, ONION (Oct. 14, 2003, 3:00 PM),
www.theonion.com/article/aclu-defends-nazis-right-to-burn-down-aclu-headqua-1648.
2
The Onion is a popular satirical newspaper. ONION, http://www.theonion.com/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2018).
3
Amber Phillips, A History of the ACLU Defending the Confederate Flag, the Tea Party, the KKK and
Rush Limbaugh, WASH. POST (June 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/19/
a-history-of-the-aclu-defending-confederate-veterans-the-kkk-and-rush-limbaugh/?utm_term=.ff408d5a7c03.
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number of white supremacist groups, the ACLU is a tax-exempt 501(c)(3)
charitable organization. 4
One such white supremacist group is the National Policy Institute (NPI). 5
This benignly named group is dedicated to “the heritage, identity, and future of
people of European descent in the United States, and around the world.” 6 In
less polite language, it is a white power group. NPI was, until very recently, a
501(c)(3) organization. 7 This means that it did not have to pay federal taxes,
and people who sent money to NPI could take deductions on their personal
taxes. 8 From the perspective of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a donation
to the ACLU was treated exactly the same as a donation to NPI.
Richard Spencer, one of the leading voices of the alt-right and probably the
most vocal white supremacist of our time, runs NPI. 9 Spencer is enjoying what
I will optimistically call his fifteen minutes of fame. He is a frequent interview
subject in the mainstream press, often called upon to explain President
Trump’s appeal to white supremacists. 10 You may have heard him interviewed
on All Things Considered 11 or seen him on PBS Newshour, 12 and he recently
led the Charlottesville protest against the removal of a statue of Robert E.
Lee 13 that resulted in the death of a counter protester. 14 But he is probably
4
Please note that this sentence oversimplifies the structure of the ACLU. The ACLU referred to in this
sentence is the ACLU Foundation, a 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to litigation and public education efforts.
The ACLU is a 501(c)(4) member organization that engages in legislative lobbying. Donations to a 501(c)(4)
are not tax deductible. See ACLU vs. ACLU Foundation, AM. C.L. UNION PA., https://www.aclupa.org/
abouttheaclu/aclu-vs-aclu-foundation/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
5
National Policy Institute Inc, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/
521259838 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
6
Matt Pearce, IRS Strips Tax-Exempt Status from Richard Spencer’s White Nationalist Nonprofit, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-richard-spencer-taxes-20170223-story.
html.
7
Michael Kunzelman, White Nationalist Group’s Tax-Exempt Status Revoked by US, U.S. NEWS (Mar.
14, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-03-14/irs-revokes-white-nationalistgroups-tax-exempt-status.
8
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012).
9
Lance Williams, Meet the Ex-GOP Insider Who Created White Nationalist Richard Spencer, CTR.
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (July 21, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/meet-the-gop-insider-whocreated-white-nationalist-richard-spencer/.
10
Id.
11
“We’re Not Going Away”: Alt-Right Leader on Voice in Trump Administration, NPR (Nov. 17, 2016,
4:18 PM), www.npr.org/2016/11/17/502476139/were-not-going-away-alt-right-leader-on-voice-in-trumpadministration.
12
How a White Nationalist Leader Wants to Go Mainstream with His Racist Movement, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 14, 2016, 6:30 PM), www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white-nationalist-leader-wants-gomainstream-racist-movement/.
13
Laura Vozzella, White Nationalist Richard Spencer Leads Torch-Bearing Protesters Defending Lee
Statue, WASH. POST (May 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/alt-rights-
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most well-known for his Nazi-inspired celebration of Trump’s election, with
Spencer leading a group in chants of “hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory”
at an alt-right conference in Washington, D.C. 15 In the wake of that
controversy, on March 13, 2017, the IRS revoked NPI’s 501(c)(3) status. 16
One might assume that the revocation was for ideological reasons. After
all, NPI’s primary activity is to disseminate pseudo-scientific racist rants. 17 As
part of the modern white supremacist movement, NPI’s carefully curated brand
of racism might sound familiar. 18 In the parlance of modern white
supremacists, NPI is pro-white, not anti-black or anti-immigrant, and NPI
members are not racists, they are “race realists.” 19 Although apparently unable
to tamp down the urge for spontaneous Nazi salutes, NPI generally avoids
obviously racist symbolism such as swastikas and burning crosses. 20 The
leaders prefer business suits to Ku Klux Klan hoods, and eschew racial epithets
in favor of quasi-academic language. 21 The group embraces school segregation
not because they do not want their children to go to school with black children,
but because “Darwinian evolution endowed different groups with different
distributions of aptitude and ability.” 22 Similarly, they blame the mass
incarceration of black men not on a discriminatory criminal justice system, but
on a genetic defect. 23 In other words, NPI points to the legacies of systemic
U.S. racism (e.g., poor school performance, low personal wealth, and high

richard-spencer-leads-torch-bearing-protesters-defending-lee-statue/2017/05/14/766aaa56-38ac-11e7-9e48c4f199710b69_story.html.
14
Joe Heim et al., One Dead as Car Strikes Crowds Amid Protests of White Nationalist Gathering in
Charlottesville; Two Police Die in Helicopter Crash, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/fights-in-advance-of-saturday-protest-in-charlottesville/2017/08/12/155fb636-7f1311e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html.
15
See Daniel Lombroso & Yoni Appelbaum, “Hail Trump!”: White Nationalists Salute the PresidentElect, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/richard-spencerspeech-npi/508379/.
16
Pearce, supra note 6.
17
Before the NPI website was taken down, it stated that NPI is “an independent research and
www.facebook.com/
educational
foundation.”
See
National
Policy
Institute,
FACEBOOK,
TheNationalPolicyInstitute (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
18
See generally Pete Simi & Robert Futrell, Negotiating White Power Activist Stigma, 56 SOC. PROBS.
89, 89–90 (2009).
19
Alternative Right, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/ideology/alternative-right (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
20
Simi, supra note 18, at 92.
21
Id.
22
Raymond Wolters, Why School Reform Failed, AM. RENAISSANCE (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.
amren.com/news/2015/08/why-school-reform-failed/.
23
See Byron Roth, The War on Human Nature, NAT’L POL’Y INST. (May 17, 2015), http://archive.is/
29Gnj.
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incarceration rates) as evidence of an inherent deficiency in non-white
populations. 24
Suffice it to say that Richard Spencer and NPI do not hide their racism.
This brand of racism may have a modern veneer, but it shares the ultimate
goals of Madison Grant’s eugenics 25 and the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan.
To state what is painfully obvious to anyone with a modicum of awareness,
racism has persisted and evolved, with groups like NPI merely serving as white
supremacy’s most recent torchbearer. 26
But the IRS did not revoke NPI’s tax-exempt status because of its hateful
rhetoric and retrograde beliefs. 27 However, it could have. Indeed, about a
quarter of a century ago, the IRS revoked Bob Jones University’s 501(c)(3)
status because the school prohibited interracial dating and marriage among its
students. 28 The Supreme Court upheld the revocation, holding that the school’s
practices were against a compelling government public policy, emphasizing
the government’s “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education.” 29
If Bob Jones University’s rules against interracial dating and marriage were
against a compelling public policy, perhaps NPI’s goal of racial segregation
could be used to revoke NPI’s tax-exempt status. Although the Bob Jones
holding has been limited to segregation in education, it is certainly not a stretch
to think segregation in general is against a compelling government public
policy. 30 But the IRS did not make this argument, and NPI’s tax-exempt status
24
Ta-Nehisi Coates is the most recent author to question whether “white” has any meaning. See
generally TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015). From a legal perspective, the meaning of
white has proven malleable enough to encompass a dramatically disparate number of ethnic groups. See IAN
HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xxii (rev. 2006) (noting that white
“refers to an unstable category which gains its meaning only through social relations and that encompasses a
profoundly diverse set of persons”). NPI tries to sidestep this conundrum by using the word to mean “people of
European descent.” See Lombroso & Appelbaum, supra note 15.
25
See generally MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE: OR, THE RACIAL BASIS OF
EUROPEAN HISTORY (rev. 1918).
26
See Robert Futrell & Pete Simi, The [Un]surprising Alt-Right, CONTEXTS, June 16, 2017, at 76 (“The
collective surprise at White supremacists’ arrival on the national stage reflects a lack of attention to the varied
and persistent forms of racial extremism that have long simmered in America.”).
27
Kunzelman, supra note 7.
28
Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 574 (1983).
29
Id. at 604. Incidentally, more than three decades after revocation, the school has regained tax-exempt
status by, in part, renouncing its former anti-miscegenation policies. See Nathaniel Cary, Bob Jones University
Regains Nonprofit Status 17 Years After It Dropped Discriminatory Policy, GREENVILLE NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017,
5:20 PM), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/education/2017/02/16/bju-regains-nonprofit-status17-years-after-dropped-discriminatory-policy/98009170/.
30
461 U.S. at 604.
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was revoked for a much more mundane reason: NPI failed to file necessary
paperwork. 31 Tax-exempt organizations are required to file annual information
returns, and if an organization fails to file a form for three consecutive years,
the organization’s 501(c)(3) status is automatically revoked. 32 Sadly, this
administrative oversight is easily remedied, and it is a near certainty that not
only will NPI regain tax-exempt status (if it so desires), but it may also get that
tax-exempt status retroactively reinstated. 33
This raises the question: why does a group formed to promote segregation
and disseminate racist propaganda enjoy tax-exempt status? The answer is a
complicated mix of absurdly broad Treasury regulations, unconstitutionally
vague tests, and budgetary constraints. But before addressing why groups like
NPI are tax-exempt, the following Part will argue why we should care.

I.

WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

One might reasonably ask why the public should care about the tax
treatment of a privately run organization. After all, your neighbor’s tax bracket
is none of your business. Indeed, some argued (apparently convincingly) that
the tax returns of presidential candidates are outside the public’s legitimate
interests. Given an apparent collective will to remain ignorant of our
president’s taxes, why should we concern ourselves with the taxes of NPI and
other white supremacist groups?
This Essay argues for three reasons why the public should care about the
tax exemption of white supremacist groups: (1) tax exemption represents
potential lost revenue for federal government programs; (2) tax exemption acts
as a public subsidy of the actions of white supremacists; and (3) tax-exempt
status serves as the federal government’s imprimatur of white supremacist
activities.
If the federal government were foregoing tax revenue simply because of an
overly inclusive tax-exempt regime, it would be a compelling reason to care
about the tax status of NPI and other white supremacist organizations. Taxexempt organizations, as the name implies, are not required to pay federal

31

Kunzelman, supra note 7.
I.R.C. § 6033(j)(i) (2015).
33
See Automatic Revocation — How to Have Your Tax-Exempt Status Retroactively Reinstated, IRS,
www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/automatic-revocation-how-to-have-your-taxexempt-status-retroactively-reinstated (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
32
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taxes. 34 The impact of this exemption is difficult to calculate, but the size of
the tax-exempt sector may be illustrative. In 2013 alone, nonprofit
organizations reported $2.26 trillion in revenues and $5.17 trillion in assets. 35
By one estimate, this amounts to approximately 5% of America’s gross
domestic product. 36 These numbers reflect the revenues of many publicly
laudable organizations and dearly held institutions, but they also include some
white supremacist groups.
Admittedly, it would be folly to use these numbers to calculate the
potential tax revenue foregone due to tax exemption. After all, tax-exempt
entities have no incentive to engage in tax planning, and may therefore report
revenues without negative consequences. One would certainly expect the
revenue reported by tax-exempt organizations to look different if they were
subject to federal tax. Further, if we were to impose a tax on these entities, taxexempt organizations that spend most of their funds on their charitable
programming would have little taxable income, due to the deductibility of
expenses. 37 Thus, the amount of foregone revenue is difficult to measure.
Perhaps all we can say is that there is a significant amount of activity that
remains untaxed due to the tax-exemption, and the failure to tax these
organizations may result in less revenue for the federal government, thereby
shifting the burden to tax payers.
Beyond the foregone tax revenue, a more compelling reason to care about
the exemption of white supremacist groups is that 501(c)(3) status might be
considered a public subsidy. Although theorists have not found consensus on
why we exempt certain groups from taxes, 38 the most widely embraced theory
34
26 U.S.C § 501(a) (2012) (“An organization described in [501(c)(3)] shall be exempt from
taxation . . . .”).
35
This number represents reporting nonprofits and only accounts for 35% of the nonprofit organizations
registered with the IRS. BRICE MCKEEVER, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC
CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 2 (2015).
36
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2014).
37
Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 289 (2011)
(“[T]axation of income would not seriously concern those organizations that spend nearly all their funds on
current activities.”).
38
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1379, 1381 (1991) (“It is extraordinary that no generally accepted rationale exists for the multi-billion
dollar exemption from income and property taxes that is universally conferred on ‘charitable’ institutions.”).
“Tax theorists have long debated the rationales for the federal income tax system’s favorable treatment of
philanthropy. The debate has certainly become more sophisticated, but it has nonetheless failed to produce
anything near full convergence of opinion.” Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic
Underwrite De Toqcueville’s Democracy, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 3–4 (2014). This is despite the fact that
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posits that we should subsidize charitable activity because it provides
necessary goods to needy populations, promotes pluralism and diversity, and
relieves the burdens of the federal government. 39 Although the subsidy theory
does not have universal theoretical support, despite the Supreme Court’s
oblique endorsement, 40 it is the leading theory of tax-exemption. 41 And to the
extent that tax-exempt status is a subsidy, we should be concerned with the
IRS indiscriminately bestowing status upon hate groups. This practice results
in our collective tax dollars subsidizing opinions and practices that are
antithetical to American public policy.
Finally, many argue that the federal government’s bestowal of tax-exempt
status carries an implicit governmental approval of the organization’s
activities. 42 The award of tax-exempt status not only relieves the organization
of the burden of federal taxation, but it also allows donors to deduct their
contributions from their personal tax liability. By allowing this tax deduction,
we imply an equivalence between donating to tax-exempt organizations and
paying taxes. For most tax-exempt entities, this makes sense. Organizations
that provide shelter to the homeless, for example, provide a service that many
believe the government should provide. Thus, perhaps payments to such
such favorable treatment can trace its roots to the dawn of seventeenth-century England. Linda Sugin, Rhetoric
and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 102 (2016) (“The definition of charity in
American law originates from England’s Statute of Charitable Uses. Passed in 1601, the statute coincidentally
produced a legal definition of charity.”). But see Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax
Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 426 (1998)
(“The seeds of the tax exemption notion for American ‘charitable’ organizations can be traced to fourteenth
century England.”).
39
This theory’s roots are found in legislative history. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) (“The
exemption from taxation . . . is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of
revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from
public funds . . . .”). Whether tax exemption is the most efficient means to promote this activity is beyond the
scope of this Essay, as are discussions of the other, rather compelling, theories of tax exemption. See, e.g., Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990) (discussing the nonprofit sector’s
promotion of altruism); Crimm, supra note 38 (discussing a risk theory); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for
Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) (discussing a
market failure theory).
40
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (“The system
Congress has enacted provides [a] subsidy to non profit civic welfare organizations generally, and an
additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in substantial lobbying. In short,
Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that non profit
organizations undertake to promote the public welfare.”).
41
See Hall & Colombo, supra note 38, at 1383 n.7 (“We follow the prevailing view that the charitable
exemption constitutes an implicit government subsidy . . . .”).
42
See Lynn Lu, Flunking the Methodology Test: A Flawed Tax-Exemption Standard for Educational
Organizations that “Advocate a Particular Position or Viewpoint,” 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 377,
379 (2004) (“Tax-exempt status . . . may be perceived as a symbol of governmental tolerance, if not outright
approval, of activities that do not receive direct public funding.”).
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organizations should be treated as if they were payments to the government
(i.e., taxes). But sheltering the homeless is a far cry from advocating
segregation and promulgating racist propaganda. If tax exemption serves as an
implied governmental approval of the activities of tax-exempt organizations,
many would consider it unacceptable to allow the exemption to apply to white
supremacist groups, which espouse a belief system that is fundamentally antiAmerican. 43

II. HOW WHITE SUPREMACIST GROUPS GET TAX EXEMPTION
A. An Elusive Tax-Exempt Purpose
The IRS may grant tax-exempt status only to those applicants that are
organized and operated “exclusively” for “religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes.” 44 Although
exclusively has been interpreted to mean primarily, the test and its enumerated
purposes remain. 45 Thus, the question is clear: which enumerated purpose does
promoting white supremacy fall within?
Although proponents of white supremacy often display a zeal that borders
on the religious, most white supremacist organizations do not purport to be a
religion. Similarly, such organizations do not claim to further scientific
purposes or test for public safety. Due to an elusive definition of “charity,” 46
one might conceivably argue that such organizations are “charitable.” But we
need not engage in this definitional odyssey 47 because the IRS awards tax43

See Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2009). There are a number of other requirements imposed upon tax-exempt
entities—including the restriction against political activity, the limitation on lobbying, the prohibition against
private inurement or significant private benefit—but discussion of these requirements is beyond the scope of
this Essay. See id.
45
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 77 (11th ed. 2016) (noting that the
law “treat[s] the word exclusively as if it meant primarily”).
46
“Charity” can mean anything from “to esteem highly, to love” (based on the etymological definition
of “charity”) to “an organization set up to provide help and raise money for those in need” (based on the
Oxford English Dictionary definition of “charity”). Compare Charity, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY,
www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=charity (last visited Jan. 19, 2018), with Charity, OXFORD LIVING
DICTIONARIES: ENGLISH, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/charity (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
47
“The term ‘charitable’ is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is,
therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt
purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of ‘charity’ as developed by judicial decisions. Such term
includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of
education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the
above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to
44
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exempt status to white supremacist organizations for another reason: they
qualify as educational.

B. Wait . . . How Is White Supremacy Educational?
NPI supports and disseminates a wide variety of publications “dedicated to
the heritage, identity, and future of people of European descent in the United
States and around the world.” 48 This is all in an in an effort “to do the
impossible: give voice to the interests of white peoples.” 49 Subject matter
aside, one could make a colorable, if cynical, argument that these activities are
educational. And it is this argument that provides the basis for tax exemption
for white supremacists. But how does the IRS determine that racist propaganda
is educational? An investigation into the IRS’s determination process is
illustrative.

1. What Is Educational?
As straightforward as it might seem, the determination of whether an
organization is dedicated to educational purposes is fraught with definitional
issues that strongly reek of unconstitutionality. According to the Treasury
Regulations, “educational” relates to either “[t]he instruction or training of the
individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities” or
“[t]he instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and
beneficial to the community.” 50 This definition, while fairly unobjectionable,
unfortunately fails to provide much direction to the IRS. To address this, the
Treasury Regulations provide four examples of organizations that should
qualify as educational. 51 The first example describes characteristics that would
qualify as educational by any reasonable standard:
a primary or secondary school, a college, or a professional or trade
school, which has a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty,
defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile
delinquency.” See Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 576–77 (1994) (citing 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)).
48
About, NAT’L POL’Y INST., https://nationalpolicy.institute/whoarewe (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
49
Home, NAT’L POL’Y INST., https://nationalpolicy.institute (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
50
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). Despite the apparent dearth of community benefits evident in white
supremacist literature, the IRS has taken a permissive view and “has demonstrated a willingness to assume the
existence of both individual and societal benefits, absent any glaring indications to the contrary.” Alex Reed,
Subsidizing Hate: A Proposal to Reform the Internal Revenue Service’s Methodology Test, 17 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 823, 828 (2012) (citing Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the Federal Educational
Tax Exemption for Propaganda Organizations, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 497 (1985)).
51
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).
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and a regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place
where the educational activities are regularly carried on. 52

So far, there is no obvious controversy. This regulation describes what are
colloquially and legally recognized as schools. And if we are going to give tax
exemption to any educational organizations, one would naturally assume a
school should qualify. The third example is also uncontroversial, as it describes
entities that provide educational materials “by means of correspondence or
through the utilization of television or radio.” 53 The fourth example, while
certainly curious, is similarly uncontroversial, noting that “[m]useums, zoos,
planetariums, symphony orchestras, and other similar organizations” should
qualify as educational. 54
Of the four examples of educational organizations described in the
regulations, the controversy lies in the second example. Here, the regulations
provide that an organization dedicated to “presenting public discussion groups,
forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs” will qualify as
educational. 55 This broad category encompasses a number of organizations,
often referred to as advocacy groups that may or may not fit the colloquial
definition of “education.” 56 Indeed, this category is broad enough to
conceivably include white supremacist groups.
This uncomfortable breadth drove the IRS to impose a greater burden upon
certain groups, implementing a test of questionable constitutionality on socalled “advocacy” organizations. 57 The idea was to capture organizations that
might technically fit in the broad educational category, but were actually
disseminating propaganda under the guise of education. To do so, the
regulations dictate that if an organization advocates a “particular position or
viewpoint,” 58 it must prove that it “presents a sufficiently full and fair
exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form
an independent opinion or conclusion.” 59 The regulation closes by noting that
52

Id. at ex. 1.
Id. at ex. 3.
54
Id. at ex. 4.
55
Id. at ex. 2.
56
See Reed, supra note 50 at 828–29 (“Historically, Service has construed the educational exemption
liberally. . . . Under the current version of the Code, propaganda groups may qualify as 501(c)(3) educational
organizations if they meet certain requirements. . . . [And] rather than define educational to exclude all
propaganda organizations categorically, Treasury’s current regulation allows advocacy groups to obtain
charitable status as educational organizations if they can provide factual support for their arguments.”).
57
Id.
58
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).
59
Id.
53
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if an organization’s “principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported
opinion,” then the organization is not educational and does not qualify for taxexempt status. 60
Unfortunately for the IRS, this inquiry, known as the “full and fair
exposition” test, was found unconstitutionally vague. 61 Applying the test, the
IRS denied tax exemption to a feminist organization on the grounds it
promoted lesbianism without providing a full and fair exposition. 62 The
organization appealed this ruling, and the D.C. Circuit held that the full and
fair exposition test was unconstitutionally vague because it provided no
objective standard to determine what organizations were subject to the test and
no objective standard to ascertain if an organization met the test. 63
In an effort to inject some objectivity to the full and fair exposition inquiry,
the IRS developed a test that reviewed the organization’s methodology, or
basis, for the materials presented. This test asks whether such opinions have a
sound factual basis by identifying the following factors as indicators that an
organization is not educational: 64
(1) The presentation of viewpoints unsupported by facts represents a
significant portion of the organization’s communications.
(2) The facts that purport to support the viewpoints appear distorted.
(3) The organization’s presentations make substantial use of
inflammatory and disparaging terms and express conclusions more
on the basis of strong emotional feelings than of objective
evaluations.
(4) The approach used in the organization’s presentations is not aimed
at developing an understanding on the part of the intended audience
or readership because it does not consider their background or
training in the subject matter. 65

60

Id. For a comprehensive review of the evolution of this test, see Reed, supra note 50.
See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the full and fair
exposition test “lacks the requisite clarity, both in explaining which applicant organizations are subject to the
standard and in articulating its substantive requirements”).
62
See id. at 1033.
63
Id. at 1039.
64
Internal Revenue Manual 4.76.11.4, IRS (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076011.html.
65
Id.
61
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The primary appeal of this test, known as the Methodology Test, 66 is that it
avoids any investigation into the substance of the organization’s position. It
would be unwise, and likely unconstitutional, to base a tax-exemption
determination on whether the IRS approved of the content of the opinions
forwarded by a particular entity. So, rather than assessing the subject matter,
the Methodology Test focuses on the “method used by an organization in
advocating its position.” 67 Thus, even if an organization forwards minority
opinions or nonmainstream viewpoints, it might qualify as educational if it can
prove that it arrived at such opinions and viewpoints through a sound
methodology.
Unfortunately, the Methodology Test suffers from the same deficiency that
plagued the full and fair exposition test: an unclear instruction on when the test
is applicable. Similar to the “full and fair exposition” test, the Methodology
Test fails to provide an objective standard to determine what organizations are
subject to the test. As several commentators have pointed out, there is no clear
standard to determine when the test is triggered. 68 Professor Colombo
identifies the absurdity of the test by noting “even traditional educational
institutions such as universities engage in a considerable amount of viewpointpushing.” 69 And yet, such “traditional educational institutions” are not subject
to the Methodology Test. 70
The closest we have in the way of guidance is a statement in the Internal
Revenue Manual that the test should apply when an organization advocates a
particular position on “controversial” subjects. 71 Unfortunately, there is no
definition of “controversial” and this determination is left entirely to the IRS. If
one were concerned about the vagueness of when, precisely, the Methodology
Test is triggered, a limitation to “controversial” subjects would not likely
assuage any fears. Professor Lu notes that these criteria are “hopelessly
unclear, if not unconstitutionally vague, because they fail to articulate a

66
See HOPKINS, supra note 45, at 266 (“In the aftermath of the voiding of the full and fair exposition
test, the IRS advanced the methodology test, pursuant to which a presentation is evaluated by that agency to
determine whether it may be educational, as opposed to propaganda.”).
67
Rev. Proc. 86–43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
68
See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption
for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 852 (1993).
69
Id. at 853.
70
Internal Revenue Manual 7.25.3.7.11.5, IRS (Feb. 23, 1999), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07025-003.
71
Id.
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principled and objective basis for the distinction between advocacy and nonadvocacy.” 72
Thus, the initial determination of whether an organization advocates is
based entirely on whether the IRS believes the organization is advocating a
position on controversial subjects. Lu argues that this subjectivity results in “an
incoherent, ill-advised scheme that leaves a politically and socially, if not
numerically, significant range of organizations vulnerable to discrimination.” 73
Citing the court decision that struck down the full and fair exposition test, Lu
makes a convincing argument that such unfettered discretion is
unconstitutional. 74
To date, however, the Methodology Test has not been challenged. So,
despite the questionable constitutionality of the Methodology Test, it stands as
the means by which the IRS should determine whether an advocacy
organization’s materials qualify as educational.

2. Applying a Questionably Constitutional Test
Even under the most charitable application of the Methodology Test, NPI’s
literature fails to qualify as educational. This is despite the fact that, as noted
above, the modern white supremacist movement takes great pains to avoid
overtly “inflammatory language” and cloaks its claims in facially scientific
terms. 75 The real difficulties for modern white supremacist groups are the
Methodology Test’s requirements of a “factual foundation for the
viewpoint . . . [it] advocate[s]” 76 and an avoidance of conclusions based on
“strong emotional feelings” rather than “objective evaluations.” 77
Many of NPI’s publications contain unsupported viewpoints or positions.
For example, one article published by NPI asserts that disparate intelligence
quotient (IQ) results among the races serve as proof of a genetic difference in
mental ability among the races. 78 Setting aside the offensive suggestion that
72

See Lu, supra note 42, at 382.
Id. at 383.
74
Id. at 402 (citing Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the
assertion that advocacy is the same as controversial “cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny” and also
that “[i]t gives IRS officials no objective standard by which to judge which applicant organizations . . . have
been deemed advocates and held to the ‘full and fair exposition’ standard”).
75
See Alternative Right, supra note 19 (noting that the alt-right “generally adhere[s] to ‘scientific
racism’”).
76
Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
77
Id.
78
See Roth, supra note 23.
73

AMARANTE GALLEYFINAL

2058

2/15/2018 12:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 67:2045

nonwhite people have less mental capacity than white people (and
momentarily ignoring the fact that “white” has no settled meaning), this
conclusion ignores the following facts: (1) such results fail to hold constant
environmental and socioeconomic factors 79 and (2) IQ scores rise about three
points per decade in most developed nations, strongly disproving any potential
genetic cause. 80 The thesis of this particular article is, at best, unsupported by
facts (prong one of the Methodology Test), and at worst, promulgating
distorted facts (prong two of the Methodology Test). Another article formerly
hosted on NPI’s now-defunct website, entitled “The Great Erasure,” asserts
that immigration patterns across the world have created a situation in which
“the White race faces complete erasure from the Earth.” 81 Not only does this
assertion lie upon a questionable factual basis (prong one of the Methodology
Test), but it is also difficult to call this anything other than a conclusion based
upon “strong emotional feelings” rather than objective evaluations (prong three
of the Methodology Test). 82 It should come as no surprise that a group founded
to promote white supremacy would publish works based on distorted facts and
come to conclusions based on strong emotional feelings.
Given that many of NPI’s publications practically beg to fail the
Methodology Test, why would the IRS grant such an organization 501(c)(3)
status? And to be clear, NPI is not the only hate-based organization that enjoys
favorable tax treatment. Similar groups litter the list of approved tax-exempt
organizations. For example, the New Century Foundation, a tax-exempt entity,
hosts the hate-filled American Renaissance website, 83 which features articles
with titles such as “It’s About Erasing White People” 84 and “Why the Left
Wants a Non-White America.” 85 Another tax-exempt organization, the Vdare
Foundation, claims that the diversity of races and cultures in the United States
will ultimately result in demise of the country. 86 The number of white
supremacist groups that enjoy tax-exempt status leads one to incredulously ask
79
See JAMES R. FLYNN, ARE WE GETTING SMARTER?: RISING IQ IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134–
35 (2012).
80
Ulric Neisser, Rising Scores on Intelligence Tests, 85 AM. SCIENTIST 440, 440 (1997).
81
Alex Kurtagic, The Great Erasure, NAT’L POL’Y INST. (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.npiamerica.org/
research/category/the-great-erasure.
82
For a more complete discussion of how white supremacist advocacy organizations fail the
Methodology Test, see Reed, supra note 50, at 840–41.
83
AMERICAN RENAISSANCE, WWW.AMREN.COM (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
84
Chris Roberts, It’s About Erasing White People, AM. RENAISSANCE (Mar. 16, 2017),
www.amren.com/commentary/2017/03/left-wing-anti-white-racism-beauchamp-vox.
85
Hubert Collins, Why the Left Wants a Non-White America, AM. RENAISSANCE (Mar. 11, 2017),
WWW.amren.com/commentary/2017/03/left-wants-non-white-america.
86
See, e.g., Tag Archives: Diversity Is Strength, VDARE, www.vdare.com/tag/diversity-is-strength
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
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how they passed the Methodology Test. A cursory review of the material
promulgated by these organizations would find them “controversial,” and
therefore subject to the test. And once subject to the Methodology Test, one
would assume the IRS would find the material is unsupported by facts (the first
factor of the Methodology Test), presents distorted facts (the second factor of
the Methodology Test), makes use of inflammatory and disparaging terms (part
of the third factor of the Methodology Test), or expresses conclusions based on
strong emotional feelings rather than objective evaluations (also part of the
third factor of the Methodology Test). It is impossible to believe that the IRS
has vetted the foundation of these organizations’ materials and found that they
provide a full and fair exposition of facts. Indeed, it is more likely that the IRS
did not engage in this inquiry due to practical obstacles such as the test’s
questionable unconstitutionality and the IRS’s inadequate budget.

III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. The IRS’s Dwindling Budget and the Unconstitutionality of the
Methodology Test
It is not difficult to imagine a regime that refuses to grant favorable tax
treatment to hate-based organizations. In fact, the IRS denied tax-exempt status
to two white supremacist organizations—the Nationalist Movement 87 and the
National Alliance 88—because they failed the Methodology Test. But more
recently, the IRS has been reluctant to more aggressively police tax-exempt
applications. 89 This Essay suggests two potential reasons for this hesitancy: the
IRS’s budget limitations and the questionable constitutionality of the
Methodology Test.
Regardless of whether the IRS is the proper agency to determine
appropriateness of tax exemption, 90 budgetary constraints have rendered it
wholly incapable of conducting a meaningful investigation into the worthiness
87

See Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558 (1994), aff’d, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994).
See Nat’l All. v. U.S., 710 F.2d 868 (1983). Note that the IRS held that the organization failed the full
and fair exposition requirement, but the appellate court simply held that the organization would meet no
reasonable definition of educational. See id. The constitutionality of the Methodology Test therefore remained
untested.
89
See Brandon Rittiman & Anna Staver, Verify: Yes, Some Hate Groups Get Tax Exempt Status,
9NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017, 7:19 PM), http://www.9news.com/news/local/verify/verify-yes-some-hate-groups-gettax-exempt-status/465210606.
90
This is an interesting inquiry that is beyond the scope of this Essay. Suffice it to say that there is a
strong argument to be made that the IRS, designed as a tax-collecting entity, was never meant to serve any
oversight role.
88
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of aspiring tax-exempt entities in an efficient manner. Over the past decade,
the IRS budget has steadily declined, 91 resulting in a stark reduction in staffing
and a general inability to engage in meaningful enforcement actions. 92 With
little hope for relief in the future, 93 it might not be reasonable to expect the IRS
to ramp up investigations into white supremacist groups enjoying tax
exemption. This is especially true given the questionable constitutionality of
the Methodology Test.
As noted above, a number of scholars have questioned the constitutionality
of the Methodology Test. 94 These arguments are persuasive. Even if one
ignores the troubling subjectivity of the threshold question of whether an
organization’s activities are controversial, the test is rife with subjective
inquiries. What objective standard, for example, is the IRS expected to apply to
determine if a particular organization’s publications are based upon “strong
emotional feelings”? 95 And how, precisely, is the IRS to determine that a
particular organization fails to consider the background or training of the
intended audience? 96 It is not a stretch to say that the Methodology Test
“imposes an intolerable risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” 97
because, despite its careful formulation, the test asks the IRS to engage in an
inquiry that is so subjective as to be unconstitutionally vague. It is, in fact,
deficient for the same reason that the full and fair exposition test was found
deficient. 98 Perhaps the only reason that the test has not been ruled
unconstitutional is simply because the IRS no longer uses it to deny tax
exemption. 99

91
Not including 2016, which saw a “nominal increase in IRS funding . . . though funding was
essentially flat in inflation-adjusted terms.” See Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, IRS Funding Cuts Compromise
Taxpayer Service and Weaken Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 4, 2016),
www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/irs-funding-cuts-compromise-taxpayer-service-and-weaken-enforcement.
92
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, supra note 36, at 1 (“Staffing has declined by
about 10,000 full-time equivalents . . . since fiscal year 2010, and performance has been uneven.”).
93
See Alan Rappeport, Under Trump, an Already Depleted I.R.S. Could Face Deep Cuts, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/trump-mnuchin-irs.html?mcubz=0 (“The
White House budget office has proposed a 14.1 percent cut to the I.R.S. for the fiscal year that begins in
October.”).
94
See Reed, supra note 50, at 864–65 (citing Laura B. Chisholm, Exempt Organization Advocacy:
Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 219 (1988); Brian A. Hill, First Amendment Vagueness
and the Methodology Test for Determining Exempt Status: Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, 48 TAX L.
569, 579–82 (1995); Lu, supra note 42, at 382; and Thompson, supra note 50, at 491).
95
See Rev. Pro. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
96
See id.
97
Lu, supra note 42, at 384.
98
See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
99
See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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B. Exemption for All
As the previous section noted, the IRS has the unenviable position of
applying a test of questionable constitutionality in the face of crippling
budgetary constraints. Given this reality, the IRS faced two potential options:
(1) continue to bestow 501(c)(3) status to every organization that purports to
be educational or (2) more aggressively use the questionably constitutional
Methodology Test.
Of these options, the IRS appears to have taken the path of least resistance:
granting 501(c)(3) status to any organization that claims to have an educational
purpose. One might refer to this as an “exemption to all” 100 practice, and it is
reflected in the fact that white supremacist organizations continue to enjoy tax
exemption despite publishing controversial materials that lack full and fair
exposition of facts. As Professor Reed notes, the Methodology Test “has been
relegated to an administrative anachronism—an object of historical curiosity
lacking much, if any, practical application in today’s world.” 101 By avoiding
the Methodology Test altogether, the IRS forfeited the right to identify
impermissible advocacy. Thus, organizations that publish hateful screeds on
race can self-identify as educational, avoid paying federal taxes, and allow
donors to take tax deductions.
Perhaps the IRS saw no other way forward. It could have continued along
the lines of the Nationalist Movement and National Alliance cases, refusing to
grant tax-exempt status to white supremacist groups for failure to provide a full
and fair exposition of facts, but the IRS would likely have faced a
constitutional challenge.
The IRS, therefore, faced a difficult choice, a difficulty it identified in the
National Alliance case: “The statute commands the Internal Revenue
Service . . . to steer between Scylla and Charybdis: exemption to all or
exemption, in effect, only to degree-granting academic institutions.” 102 By
briefly embracing the Methodology Test (as evidenced by the denials in the
Nationalist Movement and National Alliance cases), the IRS tried to plot “a
carefully-charted middle course.” 103
Perhaps the IRS was right, and perhaps the Methodology Test is a good
compromise between exemption to all and exemption to only traditional
100
101
102
103

See infra note 102.
Reed, supra note 50, at 869.
Nat’l All. v. U.S., 710 F.2d 868, 876 (1983).
Id. at 876.
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educational institutions. But even if this was a good compromise, by
completely jettisoning the Methodology Test, the IRS effectively steered
toward the shore of exemption to all. Thus, we have a system that, in effect,
gives organizations the option to self-proclaim an educational purpose. And
this—due to either the IRS’s budget constraints or a fear of lawsuits—is the
current practice of the IRS. 104
The reluctance to employ the Methodology Test is in line with the IRS’s
general movement away from scrutiny of 501(c)(3) applicants. Indeed, the IRS
appears to have foregone virtually any meaningful review of tax-exempt
applications. One example is the adoption of the Form 1023-EZ, a streamlined
application for tax exemption for certain entities. This form is available to
approximately 70% of all tax-exempt applicants, but lacks the rigor of the
traditional application and fails to provide any information for the IRS to
review. 105 Further, even without the Form 1023-EZ, the tax-exempt application
process has become little more than a rubber stamp. In 2015, the IRS approved
about 93% of all tax-exempt applications. 106 While that percentage seems high
(perhaps unacceptably so), it misleadingly suggests that the IRS denied 7% of
applications. However, the number of entities that did not receive tax-exempt
status includes about 6,500 applications that were withdrawn or incomplete. 107
Of the 101,962 applications received by the IRS in fiscal year 2015, only sixtyseven were disapproved. 108 These numbers strongly suggest that there is little
scrutiny applied to tax-exempt applications.
While the IRS appears to have failed its gatekeeping role, it cannot
justifiably be faulted. The agency was given the unreasonably difficult task of
determining a constitutionally sound way to differentiate between
impermissible advocacy and charitable educational materials. Without delving
into the substance of the purported educational materials (i.e., without
engaging in a constitutionally suspect endeavor), such a task might be
impossible. The course struck by the IRS—effectively, a regime that provides
exemption for all—might be the most prudent way forward for a critically
underfunded agency faced with a near impossible task.

104
105

See supra note 101.
See George K. Yin, The IRS’s Misuse of Scarce EO Compliance Resources, 146 TAX NOTES 267

(2015).
106

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 57 tbl.24 (2015).
In 2015, there were 6,523 applications that were either withdrawn by organization, incomplete, did
not include the required information, IRS correction disposals, and others. Id.
108
Id.
107
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C. Potential Solutions
Commentators have struggled to identify solutions to the current problem.
Reed suggests that the issue might be resolved with a more aggressive
implementation of the Methodology Test. 109 Recognizing the questionable
constitutionality of the Methodology Test, Lu calls for the development of a
bright-line rule based upon the Bob Jones decision. 110 Each of these proposals
is discussed below, but this Essay proposes a different approach. Rather than
rely upon a constitutionally questionable test (Reed’s suggestion) or resort to
more modest bright-line rule (Lu’s proposal), the Treasury Regulations should
be amended to recognize only traditional, degree-granting institutions,
distance-learning organizations, or certain enumerated entities. In other words,
we should no longer grant tax exemption to advocacy groups. With this
change, we would no longer allow white supremacists to call themselves
charities, remove the public subsidy of such reprehensible organizations, and
eliminate the government’s implicit blessing of hate groups. This section
discusses the proposals of Reed and Lu as well as this proposal and some of its
potential implications.

1. Use the Methodology Test or the Bob Jones Public Policy Test
Reed suggests that there is no problem other than a lack of initiative by the
IRS. 111 According to Reed, aggressive use of the Methodology Test at the
application stage would identify advocacy organizations at the outset and weed
out hate groups seeking tax-exempt status. 112 Although Reed recognizes that
this might burden applicants, he justifies this burden by noting that such
organizations have “the right to appeal a proposed revocation,” whereas “the
taxpayers who indirectly subsidize these organizations have no such
recourse.” 113 Reed also suggests that the IRS should more aggressively
scrutinize the use of junk science and discredited factual data to root out
organizations that cloak their hate under quasi-scientific language. 114

109

Reed, supra note 50.
Lu, supra note 42.
111
Reed, supra note 50, at 863.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 865 (“Hate groups . . . may be tempted to rely on outdated or misleading data to create an
illusion of factual support for their otherwise unfounded positions. For that reason, an organization’s use of
data that has been conclusively discredited should be viewed as a type of factual distortion implicating the
methodology test’s second factor.”).
110
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The primary issue with Reed’s suggestion is the questionable
constitutionality of the Methodology Test. Reed acknowledges this, noting that
aggressive use of the Methodology Test “would be subject to challenge under
the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.” 115 Reed also acknowledges
the difficulties of “[p]olicing the line between data that is merely unpopular
and data that has been conclusively discredited.” 116 While there is merit to
Reed’s call for more aggressive policing of white supremacist groups, the
questionable constitutionality of the Methodology Test 117 cannot be ignored.
Thus, any victories gained via a more assertive implementation of the
Methodology Test would be short-lived, as the first well-argued constitutional
challenge would likely succeed.
In contrast to Reed’s proposal, Lu persuasively suggests that the IRS
should employ a standard that has enjoyed limited success before the Supreme
Court. Borrowing a test from Bob Jones, Lu argues that the IRS should only
act to prohibit “charitable status for activities that are illegal or that violate
fundamental public policy.” 118 Lu would limit this test to those activities that
have been articulated as against fundamental public policy by each
governmental branch. 119 Thus, due to the compelling public policy against
racial discrimination in schools, any school with such practices shall not
qualify as tax-exempt. This test makes Bob Jones an easy case, as the policy
against racial discrimination in schools has been “clearly expressed by all three
branches of the government.” 120
While this is an attractive option, there are some potential issues. The first
is that it has a fairly limited application. Lu acknowledges these limitations,
noting that “it is unclear what other policies are as fundamental as the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race.” 121 Lu also identifies
concerns of “unwarranted government intrusions into private affairs” and the
IRS’s broad authority of enforcement morphing into “determinations of public
policy.” 122 Finally, it also does not directly address the concern at the heart of

115

Id. at 869.
Id. at 868–69.
117
See Colombo, supra note 68, at 852 (“[A]ll the written commentary to date agrees . . . that the ‘full
and fair exposition’ test places too much discretion in the hands of the IRS without adequate objective
guidelines for exercising it . . . . Nor have commentators found the methodology test much of an
improvement.”).
118
Lu, supra note 42, at 416.
119
Id. at 417–18.
120
Id. at 417.
121
Id. at 418. Lu suggests that gender and sexual orientation might also qualify. Id.
122
Id. at 421–22.
116
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this Essay: is advocacy of white nationalism against public policy? Although
clearly related, it is not obvious that racial discrimination in schools is the
equivalent of promulgating white supremacist propaganda. Although Lu’s
proposal addresses the unconstitutionality of the Methodology Test, to the
extent the tax exemption of white supremacist groups is troubling, this solution
might not be helpful.

2. Eliminate the Exemption for Advocacy Groups
This Essay suggests an approach that is simultaneously more modest and
more radical than both proposals. Rather than follow Reed’s suggestion to
impose the Methodology Test with more vigor or Lu’s proposed public policy
test, this Essay suggests that the solution is obvious: restrict the educational
label to those organizations that fit the traditional definition of school. That is,
rather than adopting the exemption to all approach, 123 the IRS should grant tax
exemption to educational institutions that fit the first, third, or fourth examples
of educational organizations listed in the Treasury Regulations. 124 This would
include schools, as they are defined colloquially, 125 entities that educate from a
distance, and “museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and other
similar organizations.” 126 In other words, amending the regulations to
eliminate the troublesomely broad definition of “educational” that includes
advocacy organizations. 127
This approach is more modest in that it does not require either an
aggressive implementation of a questionably constitutional test or the
development of any new tests to determine what precisely constitutes
“educational.” It is, however, a more radical proposal in that it requires an
amendment to the Treasury Regulations. This would involve lengthy and
politically fraught rulemaking procedures. Hope for a change in the regulations
is unrealistic, given the lack of political and financial power currently enjoyed
by the IRS. Indeed, such a change might only exist in the realm of fantasy. It
is, however, an attractive solution to the problem of an overly broad definition
of education.

123

Nat’l All. v. U.S., 710 F.2d 868, 875–76 (1983).
26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) (2009).
125
Colombo, supra note 68, at 847 (“Within this definition fall ‘schools’ as one might colloquially think
of them.”).
126
Id.
127
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), ex. 2 (“An organization whose activities consist of presenting
public discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs.”).
124
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In addition to the issues of implementing this proposal, this solution has
some potential substantive problems. First, it is important to note that under
this proposal, many socially acceptable, well-loved, and highly respected
organizations might find themselves without a tax exemption. That is, not all
advocacy groups engage in hate speech, and white supremacist organizations
are not the only entities that are tax-exempt due to the broad definition of
education that includes groups whose activities “consist of presenting public
discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs.” 128 For
example, nonpartisan think tanks such as the Brookings Institution 129 qualify
for tax exemption under this category while providing valuable resources to the
public.
The question we have to ask ourselves is: how important is it to incentivize
groups like the Brookings Institution (or any other think tank that enjoys
exempt status under the broad definition of “education”)? If we deem
incentivizing such groups important, then we might consider including them in
the fourth category of educational institutions. 130 Recall that the fourth
category—identifying “[m]useums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras,
and other similar organizations” as educational—is something of a catch-all for
organizations that did not fit in the previous examples. 131 Apparently, the
drafters were concerned that the first three examples of educational
organizations were lacking, leaving out certain socially valued activities that
should receive tax-exempt treatment because of their educational value. A
planetarium, for example, is not normally a degree-granting institution and it
does not necessary have a curriculum. It may not hold lectures or fora, and it
may not engage in distance learning. But clearly, the drafters were concerned
about excluding planetariums (and museums and symphonies) from the
educational institution tax exemption. So they took a reasonable measure: they
added those organizations to a non-exhaustive list.
In a similar manner, nonpartisan think tanks could be added to the fourth
category. And for that matter, any other category of organizations that do not
clearly fit into any of the remaining definitions could be listed. The difficulty
will be in the definition. And in the name of free speech, any definition should
avoid an inquiry into the suitability of the message. So if we are hoping to
exclude organizations that simply promote propaganda, we may be forced to

128
129
130
131

26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii).
About Us, BROOKINGS INST., https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/. (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), ex. 4.
Id.
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adopt something akin to the Methodology Test. If the preceding sections were
convincing, this test carries some serious constitutional questions. 132
This proposal presents a dilemma akin to the one identified in National
Alliance: exemption for all or exemption for just degree-granting academic
institutions. 133 But my proposal frames the dilemma thusly: exemption for all
organizations that claim to be educational (the current system), or exemption
for only degree-granting academic institutions, distance-learning institutions,
and certain enumerated entities (museums, symphonies, planetariums, and
similar organizations). Ultimately, for this proposal to be acceptable, we need
to determine if tax exemption for white supremacist groups is upsetting enough
to sacrifice tax exemption for other advocacy groups.
Finally, it is important to note that this proposed solution is not a cure-all.
It requires the continued vigilance of the IRS to ensure that institutions
operating in a manner contrary to public policy do not receive tax-exempt
status. After all, a school with an anti-miscegenation policy would qualify as a
school under the proposed definition despite its retrograde policies. The only
way to weed out racist organizations that fit this narrower definition of
“education” would be to police against organizations that operate contrary to
public policy.
Despite the issues, the appeal of this approach is that it removes unfettered
discretion from the IRS and no longer requires the agency to engage in an
unconstitutional inquiry regarding an organization’s advocacy. More to the
point of this Essay, it would no longer allow white supremacist organizations
to qualify as tax-exempt charities.

CONCLUSION
While the ACLU and white supremacist groups might share an unbounded
devotion to freedom of speech, this is where the similarities end. Or rather, this
is where the similarities should end. But due to an ineffective and toothless
vetting process for tax-exempt entities, both can enjoy 501(c)(3) status. The
IRS’s inability to identify hate groups in the tax-exempt application process
not only results in a public subsidy of the activities of such groups, but also
cheapens the tax-exempt status of all charities. One must ask: can 501(c)(3)
status have any meaning if it purports to cover a group that includes both the

132
133

See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
Nat’l All. v. U.S., 710 F.2d 868, 875–76 (1983).
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ACLU and NPI? What is the point of a classification that has no meaningful
boundaries?
There is no easy fix. The 501(c)(3) statute was adopted from ancient
English law with little fanfare, debate, or thought. Enforcement of this poorly
considered law was entrusted to the IRS, an agency that is, at best,
underfunded, and, at worst, poorly suited to determine tax exemption. The
addition of potentially perilous constitutional issues creates the current mess: a
poorly vetted group of so-called charities that rob the country of potential
revenue and make a mockery of the word “educational.”
The solution is to eliminate the regulations that stretch the definition of
“educational.” No longer should tax exemption depend on “the discretion of
IRS agents applying unclear Treasury regulations and IRS procedures.” 134 To
solve this problem, we need to address the vagueness of the regulations. By
limiting “educational” to mean traditional schools, distance-learning
organizations, and “museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and
other similar organizations,” 135 the IRS would no longer be forced to bestow
tax-exempt status on hate groups and the public would no longer subsidize
such groups.

134
135

Lu, supra note 42, at 382.
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii).

